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Democratization, Violent Social Conflicts, and Growth 
 
This paper investigates the empirical role of violent conflicts for the causal effect of 
democracy on economic growth. Exploiting within-country variation to identify the effect of 
democratization during the “Third Wave”, we find evidence that the effect of democratization 
is weaker than reported previously once one accounts for the incidence of conflict, while the 
incidence of conflict itself significantly reduces growth. The results show in turn that 
permanent democratic transitions significantly reduce the incidence and onset of conflict, 
which suggests that part of the positive growth effect of democratization arises because 
democratization reduces conflict incidence. When accounting for the role of violence during 
democratization, we find evidence that peaceful transitions to democracy have a significant 
positive effect on growth that is even larger than reported in the previous literature, while 
violent transitions to democracy have no, or even negative, effects on economic growth. 
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 1 Introduction
The view that democratization brings about economic prosperity and peace nds large support in
international politics. This view has often been advocated as rationale for actively supporting
democratization in dierent countries of the world. In spite of the widespread popular and
political support of this view, there is relatively little empirical evidence on the relationship
between democratization and economic growth. There is even less empirical evidence for the
role of conict in this relationship, and how conict interacts with democratization in aecting
economic performance.
This paper contributes to the literature by presenting the results of an empirical analysis
of the eects of democratization and violence, and of the interaction between the two, on eco-
nomic growth. The analysis is motivated by the ongoing academic debate on the link between
violence, democratization and growth. Democratic political institutions are typically thought
to reduce or avoid social conicts by facilitating the peaceful balancing of diverging interests
among the dierent groups of society and by solving commitment problems about redistribu-
tive policies.1 In view of this literature, democratization should reduce conicts and thereby
increase economic growth. It is also well documented that the democratization process itself
might be the trigger of political violence. Violent conicts during the transition to democracy
may aect economic growth not only directly, but also indirectly by shaping the features or the
institutions of the emerging democracies. In fact, the transitions to democracy have occurred
under dierent scenarios, with peaceful transitions in some, and with transitions accompanied
by openly violent social conicts in other cases. The role of violence during democratization
is, however, not obvious a priori as is nicely illustrated by Huntington's (1993) extensive dis-
cussion of the non-trivial interactions between violence and democratization during what he
called the \third wave" of democratization. After arguing that violent democratization may
be benecial by developing a deeper aversion to bloodshed among the population, he concludes
that it appears more plausible that consensual, peaceful transitions provide a better basis for the
emerging democracies (Huntington, 1993, page 276). Several other authors have argued that the
scenario under which democratization takes place, and in particular the level of violence during
the democratic transition, may have important implications for the features of the emerging
1The role of democratization for the reduction of violence is considered one of the most important issues in
political science, see Schwarzmantel (2010) for a recent survey. In economics, democratization has been shown
to arise as solution to the commitment problems and revolutionary threats faced by the ruling elites, see, e.g.,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006) and Keefer (2008).
1democracies.2 The view that the mode of the transition to democracy has persistent eects on
the features of the emerging democracies is close in spirit to the idea that the democratic tran-
sition is a critical juncture in the institutional development of a country.3 Taken together, these
arguments suggest that democratization is expected to lead, on average, to more growth-friendly
institutional environments, as well as to a reduction of growth-disrupting conicts, while the
level of violence during the transition might be particularly relevant for the future prospects of
the emerging democracies. To the best of our knowledge, however, there exists no systematic
empirical investigation of these hypotheses.
This paper provides evidence for the three distinct hypotheses that emerge naturally from
the literature and follow the arguments discussed above. The rst hypothesis is that violence
may play an important role for economic growth, in particular in the context of democratization
since the transitions may lead to conict, but the emergence of democracy may help solving
conicts peacefully within an institutional framework, rather than by violence. Testing this
hypothesis essentially implies replicating previous results in the literature while controlling ex-
plicitly for the occurrence of violent conicts since, in line with the arguments discussed above,
violent conicts may be a relevant omitted variable. The analysis builds on the annual data and
the dierence-in-dierence estimation strategy proposed by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008)
as benchmark and extends their specication to the explicit consideration of the incidence of
violent social conicts. The results conrm the nding of a positive average eect of democ-
ratization on growth, although controlling for current or past social conict weakens the eect
of democratization by about 15-25% and reduces its statistical signicance. The incidence of
violent social conict itself exhibits a strong negative eect on economic growth of more than
twice the size of the eect of a permanent democratization, regardless of the specication and
sample. Restricting attention to internal conict for the government rather than any conict
delivers weaker eects of democratization (at the order of 25-45%) and stronger eects of conict
(of around three times that of democratization). The ndings suggest that accounting for civil
conicts is important for the estimation of the growth eects of democratization.
2The role of dierent transition scenarios to democracy, and in particular the role of violence, has been discussed
mainly in political science. See Lynn (1990), Remmer (1990), Sorensen (1993), Doh (1994), Munck and Le (1997)
and Field (2004), among others.
3The importance of critical historical episodes in a country's development process has been recognized in
political science for a long time, see Moore (1966). Recent empirical evidence in economics by Acemoglu et al.
(2008, 2009) has cast doubts on the so called Aristotle-Lipset Modernization Hypothesis" (Lipset, 1959), according
to which causality runs from income (growth) to democracy, and provides indirect evidence for the importance of
\critical junctures".
2The second hypothesis, which is closely related to the rst, states that democratization re-
duces violent conicts, with the implication that part of the positive eect of democratization
on growth found in the previous literature might be due to the reduction of violence after de-
mocratization.4 The second step of the analysis therefore investigates whether democratization
reduces the incidence of violent social conicts using again a dierence-in-dierence framework
applied to annual data. The ndings document that democratization has a signicant negative
eect on the incidence of a conict, and on the probability of observing the onset of a conict,
in addition to the most important determinants of conict found in the literature. Exploiting
the heterogenous timing of democratization allows to qualify the available evidence on the weak
and often insignicant eect of democracy on social conicts.5 Interestingly, the eect of de-
mocratization on civil conicts is stronger when restricting attention to internal conicts about
the control over the government. This suggests that transitions to democracy are more eec-
tive in reducing the social struggles about the control of the government (compared to conicts
triggered by, e.g., attempts of secessions or for the control of territories).
The third hypothesis is about the possibility that violence during the democratic transition
might play a role for the features of the emerging democracies and economic growth.6 We test
this hypothesis by estimating whether peaceful transitions have the same eect on economic
growth as democracies that emerge from a violent conict. This analysis renes the one from
the rst step by separately controlling for the eect of violent conicts and the eect of violent
democratization. The results suggest that the transition scenario plays an important role for
the eects of democratization for economic growth. For the countries with a peaceful transition
to democracy the eect of democratization on growth is positive, signicant and quantitatively
4The role of democracy for conict avoidance has received considerable research interest in the political science
literature, although the test of this \democratic peace" hypothesis has mainly concerned international, rather than
civil, conicts. For instance, Ward and Gleditsch (1998) showed that democratization is associated with a lower
probability of a country being engaged in war, regardless of whether as target or aggressor.
5Exceptions are Hegre et al. (2001) and Reynal-Querol (2005) that exploit cross-country variation and nd
that democracies are signicantly less prone to civil wars. The results are also consistent with the ndings by
Br uckner and Ciccone (2007) that adverse (income) shocks are less likely to lead to civil conicts in democracies.
6Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006) model endogenous democratization as a response the threat of con-
icts. Other works, including Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Gradstein (2007), provide eciency rationales for
democratization. These works are not designed for delivering predictions about the role of dierent transition
scenarios, however. Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde (2008) provide a theory studying how democratization with
and without binding threats of conicts aect the rule of law in democracies. Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde
(2011) model the emergence of violence as an equilibrium outcome of a strategic game and study the determinants
and consequences of peaceful and violent democratization.
3larger than the average (treatment) eect of democratization. The positive eect is, however,
substantially lower or negative for the democracies emerging from violent conicts. The ndings
indicate that these democracies do not grow signicantly faster, or even grow slower, than
countries that do not experience a democratization. The dierential impact of violent and non
violent transitions is largest when restricting attention to conicts for the control of government.
The ndings also document that violent democratic transitions play a role which is dierent from
the role of violent conicts. All the results are robust to several robustness checks including
dierent denitions of violence, dierent samples and the inclusion of several controls.
The present study complements the recent empirical literature on the relationship between
democratization and growth. This literature has tried to overcome two central empirical prob-
lems in the estimation of the growth eect of democratization. The rst is the conceptualization
and measurement of democracy, and the precise identication of timing of democratization.
The second concerns the identication of the causal eect of democracy, or democratization,
on income growth. Recent empirical works address these empirical issues by exploiting within-
country variation in democratization and its timing, by accounting for country and time xed
eects. The most relevant contributions in this line of research include Rodrik and Wacziarg
(2005), Persson and Tabellini (2006) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). These studies
all nd evidence of a signicantly positive causal eect of democracy or democratization on
economic growth.7 The empirical analysis performed in this paper complements and extends
this line of research by explicitly investigating the role of violent conicts and the modes of
regime transition for the relationship between democratization and growth.8 The distinction of
direct eects of democracy on growth from indirect eects represents an additional complication
for the empirical identication of growth eects of democracy and democratization. Most of
the recent literature has concentrated on the direct eect of democracy. Tavares and Wacziarg
(2001) are exceptional in studying dierent channels through which democracy aects growth,
including war casualties. To our knowledge, no study has investigated this channel by applying a
within-country dierence-in-dierence approach based on annual data. Our study also provides
a link of this empirical literature to the literature on the causes of civil conicts. Recent nd-
7Previous studies had diculties in nding a signicant causal eect of democracy, see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), or Cheibub and Vreeland (2011) for a recent survey.
8In related work, Persson and Tabellini (2006) argue that democracy, or democratization, may be too blunt
a concept to detect eects on subsequent economic growth. While they point at the importance of economic
liberalizations and the (constitutional) details of emerging democracies, the argument here is rather that the
emergence of democracies should matter for growth but could be heterogenous depending on actual the transition
scenario.
4ings suggest that income uctuations and institutions are among the most robust time-varying
determinants of civil conicts, see, e.g., Br uckner and Ciccone (2007, 2010). While this litera-
ture has mainly used sub-Saharan African countries due to the availability of valid instruments
for income uctuations, our approach looks at the role of institutional change by applying an
identication strategy based on panel techniques following Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008)
and using a broader sample of countries. Our ndings also complement the empirical political
science literature on the relation between democracy, democratization and civil war, see, e.g.,
Gleditsch et al. (2008), Hegre et al. (2001), and Manseld and Snyder (1995, 2005). While much
of this literature has investigated the existence and linearity of an eect of static measures of
democracy, or the quality of democracy, on conict, there is little work on the causal eect of
democratization on conict incidence as presented in this paper, with work by Cederman, Hug,
and Krebs (2010) as a notable exception.9
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces estimation strategy and the data.
Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Model and Data
2.1 Estimation Strategy and Identication
The analysis adopts the data and the empirical model by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008)
as benchmark. As a rst step, we investigate the eect of democratization and violent conict
on growth by estimating the model
gi;t = lnyi;t   lnyi;t 1 = Democi;t + Conflicti;t + i + t + X0
i;t 1  + "it ; (1)
where the dependent variable gi;t is the logarithmic growth rate of annual real per capita GDP,
y in country i in year t. The estimation includes country and time xed eects, i and t,
respectively, to account for time-invariant country characteristics and for time trends that are
common across countries. The coecient of primary interest is , which captures the eect of
democratization on growth, as Democ represents a binary variable that takes value 1 in the year
of a permanent democratization episode as well as in all years thereafter, and 0 otherwise. Due to
9Cederman et al. (2010) are mainly concerned with methodological and data related problems regarding the
measurement of democracy, and nd a positive eect of democratization on conict in the period of democratiza-
tion. However, their analysis is based on a dierent identication strategy that essentially relies on cross-country
variation, whereas our analysis is based on a dierence-in-dierence design. See also Cederman, Hug, and Wenger
(2008) for a review the theoretical political science literature on this point.
5the inclusion of country and year xed eects,  represents a treatment eect of democratization
on the treated countries, in the sense of a dierence-in-dierence estimator that exploits a
democratic transition in the respective countries as treatment (rst dierence) and compares it
to the development in countries that do not experience a democratic transition, i.e., that stay
democratic, autocratic or intermediate (second dierence).10 The second coecient of primary
interest is , which estimates the eect of conict in the respective year and country on growth.
For robustness, we also estimate the model controlling for lagged conict in addition to (or
instead of) current conict. Again, the coecient has the interpretation of a treatment eect
on the treated countries in terms of dierence-in-dierences. Finally, the vector X includes
additional time-varying controls such as lagged growth and income, lagged changes and levels in
investment, government consumption, and trade openness.11 The error term, "it, is allowed to
follow a country-specic autoregressive process. Standard errors account for heteroskedasticity
clustered on the country-level.
Identication of causal eects in this context hinges on several critical assumptions. First,
for the estimates to be unbiased, the reform variables (democratization and conict) have to
be strictly exogenous. Reverse causality is unlikely in the context of democratization due to
results by Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) that suggest that the correlation between income and
democracy essentially disappears once country and year xed eects are accounted for, i.e.,
when exploiting within-country variation for identication. Non-randomness of democratization
and dierent time trends could be another issue aecting identication and leading to biases
in both directions, as discussed in detail by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). Replicating
their analysis with conict as additional variable is a natural starting point to investigate the
robustness of their previous ndings. The extensive specication of the estimation equation,
including lags of the dependent variable and of the explanatory variables should also help to
account for some of these potential confounds.
The second step of the analysis concerns the eects of democratization on conict. We
estimate a model
Conflicti;t = 'Democi;t 1 + ~ i + ~ t + X0
i;t 1~   + uit ; (2)
where the dependent variable is the incidence or onset of a civil conict in country i in year t.
The primary coecient of interest is ', which reects the eect of democratization Democ in
10The data by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) codify democratization events as full or partial democra-
tization, depending on the quality of political institutions. Countries with neither fully democratic nor fully
autocratic political institutions are coded as intermediate countries.
11The specication essentially follows Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008).
6terms of a dierence-in-dierence eect due to the inclusion of country and year xed eects.
As before, Democ represents a binary variable that takes value 1 in the year of a permanent
democratization episode as well as in all years thereafter, and 0 otherwise. Concerning the
identication of a causal eect of democratization on conict, similar arguments apply as before.
To account for the typical determinants of violent conicts that have been found relevant in the
empirical literature, the vector X includes additional time-varying controls such as lagged growth
and income. More extensive specications also include lagged changes and levels in investment,
government consumption, and trade openness. For robustness, we also include lagged conicts
as control variables in some specications. Time-invariant determinants like natural resource
dependence or ethnic polarization are accounted for by the inclusion of country xed eects ~ i,
while year xed eects account for global time trends such as the increase in the incidence of
civil war after the end of the cold war. This implies that the specication includes the major
determinants of civil war and conict identied in the empirical literature, see, e.g., Fearon
and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeer (2004), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Blattman
and Miguel (2010) and Ciccone (2011). The error term, uit, is allowed to follow a country-
specic autoregressive process. Standard errors account for heteroskedasticity clustered on the
country-level.
The third step of our analysis estimates the growth eect of democratization while distin-
guishing between violent and non-violent transitions to democracy. The estimated model is
gi;t = lnyi;t   lnyi;t 1 = Di;t + Vi;t + i + t +  X0
i;t 1(+Conflicti;t) + "it ; (3)
where again gi;t is the growth rate of annual real per capita GDP, y in country i in year t. The
rst coecient of interest in this model is , the eect of a peaceful democratization, reected
by a binary indicator variable Di;t that takes value 1 in the year of a permanent democratization
episode as well as in all years after that. The second coecient of interest is , the eect of a
democratic transition that was accompanied by violent conict, reected by a binary indicator
Vi;t that takes value 1 in the year of a permanent democratization episode in which armed
conict was observed, as well as in all years after that. Additional controls include country
xed eects i and year xed eects t that account for time-invariant country characteristics
and global time trends, respectively, as well as additional time-varying controls captured by X,
like lagged growth rates and income levels, current or lagged conict, investment, government
consumption, income and trade openness.
Due to the inclusion of country and time xed eects, this model also represents a dierence-
in-dierence setting in which coecient  reects an average treatment eect of (peaceful) de-
7mocratization on growth of the \treated" group of countries relative to control countries that
remain undemocratic or remain democratic in a particular year. The distinction of violent tran-
sitions to democracy as subgroup of all democratization experiences represents a renement of
the model in terms of an additional dierence. In other words, the distinction between all tran-
sitions to democracy, D, and the subset of transitions that was associated with violent conict,
V , implies a dierence-in-dierence-in-dierence interpretation of the coecient , since V is
essentially capturing the interaction between democratization and conict in the year of democ-
ratization. The null hypothesis is therefore  = 0, i.e., that violence during democratization
does not represent an element that is relevant from the perspective of the critical junctures
hypothesis.
2.2 Data
For estimation, we use the annual cross-country panel data for 174 countries over the period
1960-2005 compiled by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). The analysis is based on the binary
democratization indicator that is derived from a new coding of available data sources such
as the Freedom House and Polity IV Project democracy indices. A detailed chronology of
democratization events can be found in their Table 1. The data on GDP per capita and other
control variables are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.12
The data set is extended to the consideration of information on civil conicts provided by the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset version 4 (2010) including data for the period 1946-2009.
This data goes back to Gleditsch et al. (2002), and has been updated by Harbom and Wallensteen
(2010).13 We use three dierent denitions of violent conict. The least restrictive denition
is whether there has been any incident of armed conict leading to more than 25 battle-related
deaths.14 There are 782 country-year observations (14.5%) with conict incidence of any type
in the data set. An alternative denition connes conicts to be internal (without intervention
from other states) or internationalized internal armed conicts, disregarding extrasystemic or
interstate armed conicts. A third denition focuses on the reason for the conict, restricting
12See http://www.res.org.uk/economic/ta/tahome.asp and the Data Appendix of Papaioannou and Siourou-
nis (2008) for the data and a detailed description. The data also distinguish between full and partial democratiza-
tion events depending on whether the Polity indicator of the quality of the emerging political institutions exceeds
+7 and the Freedom House status is `free'.
13See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data and publications/datasets.htm for a detailed data de-
scription. The data are restricted to the period 1960-2005 for consistency.
14For a detailed discussion of the UCDP/PRIO Denitions of armed conicts, see
http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions all.htm.
8attention to conicts about government (rather than territory). This last denition constitutes
a strict subset of internal conicts. The data contain 432 country-year observations (8%) with
internal conict about the government. In the third part of the analysis, we use the observation
of conict incidence in the year of democratization or in the year before to code the transition
scenario as violent.15 For robustness, we also investigate the role of conict intensity, dening
high intensity as conicts with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year. We also use
the coding of democratization events provided by the Freedom House (Karatnycky et al., 2005),
which documents the demographic transitions of the Third Wave according to the driving forces
behind the transition. This data set also includes a classication of the democratization events
regarding the level of violence that was involved with the respective transition to democracy.
Democratic transitions are classied using an indicator of the level of violence that can take
four values: no violence, little violence, signicant violence and high violence.16 We present
results using a binary indicator of the observation of signicant or high violence compared to
no or little violence, or a binary indicator of high violence, respectively. This allows to focus
attention on violence that was explicitly related to the transition to democracy, and to examine
the robustness of the results with respect to the use of an alternative data source.
3 Results
3.1 Democratization, Violence, and Growth
The rst step of the analysis is to investigate the implications of explicitly controlling for the
occurrence of violent conicts when gauging the causal eects of democratization on income
growth. Table 1 presents the estimation results of the empirical model (1). Panel A presents
results for the baseline specication including income controls (in terms of lagged growth and
lagged income levels) for three dierent samples considered by Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2008).17 Panel B presents results for an extended specication that, in addition to lagged
15The share of violent democratization on the total in the sample varies from around 10 % for the more
restrictive denition to about 20 % for the broadest one.
16According to the Freedom House classication, about 40 % of the countries in the data set experience demo-
cratic transitions with at least signicant violence, and about 17 % of the countries observed democratic transitions
with the highest level of violence.
17The sample \20 obs." keeps only countries with at least 20 time-series observations for the dependent variable
to minimize the bias due to the joint presence of country-xed eects and the lagged dependent variable. The
sample \20 obs.; no socialist" drops former socialist countries, for which pre-transitional data quality might be
questionable.
9growth and income levels, includes current and lagged values of investment, life expectancy,
government spending and trade share as additional controls. The rst columns in each block of
the panels replicate the results from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008).18
In the full sample, democratization has a positive eect on growth of around 1-1.2 % per
year. The other columns present estimation results when conicts in terms of the incidence of
any conict, any internal conict, or any internal conict about the government, respectively, are
added as additional control. Throughout all specications, two main results emerge. First, the
incidence of conict exerts a signicant negative eect on growth. Not surprisingly, countries in
which violent conicts are happening are not growing as fast as countries without conicts. This
eect is sizable, and is about two to three times larger than the eect of democratization. Second,
the eect of democratization becomes somewhat smaller when conicts are accounted for in the
estimation. The size of the eect falls by 15-25 % compared to the benchmark specications
without conict controls. The growth eect of democratization is weakest, and in some cases
even insignicant, when controlling for the incidence of internal conicts about the government.
Likewise, internal conicts about the government appear to have the strongest negative eect
on growth in all specications, compared to the alternative conict denitions, of around -3%.
These ndings are robust to the inclusion of additional controls and are also similar across the
dierent samples.
As a robustness check, we also replicated the analysis for dierent degrees of democratization
(full, partial and borderline democratization, as well as reverse transitions). Table 2 contains
the respective results for distinguishing full from partial democratization events (Panel A), and
for distinguishing all sorts of democratization events (Panel B). The results conrm the nding
that democratization has a positive eect on growth. In particular, the results suggest that full
democratization events exert a positive growth eect, whereas partial democratization have no
or little eect on growth. The results in Panel B also indicate that reverse transitions from
democracy to non-democratic rule have a negative eect on growth. More importantly, we nd,
throughout all specications, that the incidence of conict, or the incidence of internal conict for
government, exhibit signicantly negative eects on growth, conditional on the democratization
18The specications in Columns (1), (5) and (9) of Panel A of Table 1 replicate those in Table 2 Columns
(4), (6) and (8) in Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), respectively; the specication in Columns (9) of Panel B
replicates the specication in Table 3 Column (6) of Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). The specication of the
models in panel B corresponds to the most extensive specication of Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). The
results are qualitative similar for specications that only include some of these controls and are available upon
request.
10event. As before, inclusion of conict incidence as control variable reduces the eect of the
democratization event by about one fourth.
The results suggest that conict incidence exerts a signicant negative eect on economic
growth, while controlling for conict reduces the eect of democratization. To interpret these
results recall that, according to the arguments discussed above, part of the positive eect of
democratization on growth may work precisely through a reduction in the incidence of civil
conicts. Furthermore, it may be the case that the average eect of democratization hides
relevant heterogeneity between peaceful and violent regime changes. We investigate these two
hypotheses in turn in the following subsections.
3.2 The eect of Democratization on Conicts
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the model (2). The dependent variable in Panel A
is conict incidence according to the dierent denitions. The estimation results correspond
to a specication with country and year xed eects and controls for lagged growth (up to
two lags) and lagged income levels (up to three years) across the full sample and the restricted
sample. The samples and specications are identical to the corresponding estimates in Table 1
for direct comparability. Panel B displays the estimation results for the same specication, but
using conict onset rather than incidence for the dierent denitions of conict, as dependent
variable.
The results for Panel A show that, as one should expect, countries that experienced a conict
in the past year are more likely to have an incidence of conict in the current year throughout
all conict denitions. More interesting is the nding that democratization has a negative eect
on conict incidence throughout but this eect is only signicant when considering the incidence
of internal conict about the government as dependent variable. Compared to an unconditional
probability of conict incidence of this type of 14 %, the eect is large since it corresponds to
a reduction in conict incidence of 3 to 6 percentage points, or 20 to 40 %. Part of the eect
of democratization on the reduction of internal conict is likely explained by the fact that some
democratic transitions eectively coincide with the end of civil conict about the government.
This is unlikely to be full story, however, since the results also document a reduction in the
onset of future civil conicts, as discussed next.
An alternative measure for the occurrence of conict is the onset of a conict. Since social
conict might potentially last for several years investigating whether democratization reduces
conict onsets might even be a more relevant measure than conict incidence. The results
11in Panel B display the corresponding estimation results. These results show a negative eect
of past conict on conict onset, which is to be expected given the coding of conicts.19 More
interestingly, democratization exhibits a signicant negative eect on the propensity of observing
the onset of a new conict in a country. Again, the eect is strongest when considering internal
conicts for government. The results suggest that democratization is particularly eective in
reducing the incidence and onset of conicts aimed at controlling the government. The results
in Table 1 document that these conicts have the largest negative eects on income growth.
3.3 Democratization and Growth: Violent Transitions as Critical Junctures
Taken together, these results so far suggest that part of the growth eect of democratization
might be driven by the fact that democracies reduce the risk of conict for government, which
itself has been found to have detrimental eects on economic growth. The results do not account
for the role of dierent transition scenario, however. In light of arguments presented in the
literature, the moment of democratization is a critical juncture for the emergence of the new
institutions and the modes of democratization and, in particular, the level of violence during
the transition may key for the prospects of the emerging democracy.
A rst indication that this might indeed be the case follows from Figure 1. The gure plots
the average yearly growth rate of real GDP per capita in a 20-year window around democrati-
zation. The growth rates are demeaned across countries, which eectively eliminates common
time trends across countries. Compared to the average across all countries, growth is slightly
slower before the democratization, slows down during the democratic transition, and increases
to a higher growth rate after democratization. There appears to be a dierence in this pattern
between countries that exhibit a violent transition to democracy and countries with a peace-
ful transition experience. Before democratization, both groups of countries have similar growth
rates on average. After democratization, countries with a peaceful transition have higher average
growth rates than countries with a violent transition. The Figure is purely suggestive, however,
since except for common time trends, the plots do not control for any other observable dier-
ences across the two groups of countries, including contemporaneous conicts and dierences in
past economic performance.
In order to test the hypothesis of democratization as a critical juncture and account for
19The onset of a conict refers to the beginning of a conict for a particular purpose among specic interest
groups in a country. A country can experience the onset of a new conict in a given year even if there was a
conict incidence in the past year if these conicts are dierent in terms of purpose or the groups involved. See
also Harbom and Wallensteen (2010).
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The gure plots the evolution of time-demeaned levels of growth in real GDP per capita (growth rate in real GDP
per capita in a country minus the average level of growth for that year) in the ten years before and after a permanent
democratic transition. See Section 2 for details on the data sources and denitions.
potential heterogeneity across the two groups of countries, we investigate the role of violence
during democratization by estimating the empirical model specied in (3). Table 4 presents the
respective estimation results. The dierent panels reect dierent samples. Panel A includes
results for the eects of democratization on growth based on the full sample. Panel B presents
estimates that are based on all countries excluding those with less than 20 observations of the
dependent variable to minimize the bias due to the joint presence of country-xed eects and
the lagged dependent variable. Panel C presents estimates based on a sample that also excludes
former socialist countries. The results in columns (1) and (2) present the estimation results
for the specication with only lagged income and growth controls, and for a more extensive
specication that includes investment, life expectancy, government spending and trade share as
additional controls, respectively.20
Accounting for violence during the transition as opposed to peaceful transitions in the re-
maining columns reveals an even higher treatment eect of democratization in the absence of
violence, but a signicant negative eect of violent transitions. The average eect of democra-
tization documented in Table 1 does not discriminate between peaceful and violent democrati-
zation. The results in Table 4 essentially decompose this average eect by explicitly accounting
for the dierent dierent transition scenarios. This becomes clear by observing that that the
20The coecient estimates in these two columns again represent the \unconditional" and \conditional" eects of
democratization in the terminology of the study by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). The results in Columns
(1) of Panels (B) and (C) replicate their results in Table 2 columns (6) and (8), respectively, while the result in
Column (2) of Panel C replicates those in Table 3 column (6).
13specication in column (2) of Panel A in Table 4 is identical to specication in column (1) of
Panel B in Table 1. The specications in columns (3) and (5) of Panel A in Table 4 present
results for the same specication with the only dierence of allowing for a dierential eect of
peaceful and violent democratization. The result in column (5) suggests that the average eect
of 1.2 % results from a (larger) positive eect of 1.54 % for peaceful transitions to democracy
as well as a negative eect of -1.85 for violent transitions. This implies a net negative eect on
growth of violent transitions of about -0.3 %. When restricting to conict for government, the
results imply even more pronounced dierences in the growth eect of democratization. While
peaceful transitions accelerate growth by around 1.4 %, the (net) eect of violent transitions is
similar in magnitude but opposite in sign (1.38 - 2.8). This discussion also suggests that the
positive average eect of democratization emerges since there are fewer violent transitions than
peaceful transitions in the sample. It is also worth noting that the eect of violent transitions
appear dierent from the eect of violence per se. As a matter of fact, the point estimates of
the eect of violent conicts is barely aected by the explicit consideration of the transition
scenario. The results in column (2) Panel B of Table 1 show an average eect of democratiza-
tion of about 1 %, as well as a negative eect of civil conict of -1.73 %. The corresponding
specication that accounts for the transition mode is reported in column (6) Panel A of Table 4.
The negative direct eect of conict is essentially the same with -1.75 %. Similar results emerge
when restricting attention to conicts for governments and for dierent dierent sub-samples.
The analysis of the dierent specications and samples conrm a dierential role of violent
and peaceful transitions. A peaceful transition accelerates growth in the range of 1.2-1.5 % per
year, while a violent transition reduces this eect by 1.5-2 % per year in the full sample when all
conicts are considered (columns (3)-(6)). This means that countries that experience incidences
of conict during democratization do not grow faster than the control countries. The result
is essentially unchanged when controlling for armed conict in a given year or in one of the
two years before (columns (4) and (6)). When restricting violent transitions to internal conicts
that concern the government as opposed to territory during the democratization, the detrimental
growth eect of violent transitions (and of conict per se) becomes even larger. We nd that,
compared to peaceful democratization experiences with positive growth eects of 1-1.3 %, a
violent transition reduces growth by 2-3.8 %. This means that countries that democratize under
civil war, i.e., conicts for government, actually grow less than the control group of countries
that do not democratize (or that remain democracies).21
21The null of no growth eect can be rejected at the 5% level.
14The results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged when restricting attention to the
sample with more reliable information on the dependent variable or excluding socialist countries:
democratization has a signicant positive eect on growth if the transition occurs in the absence
of conict. If the transition is accompanied by violence, the eect is negative and growth in
these countries is not faster than in control countries, or is slower. These results are robust to
including higher order lags for conicts as additional controls as reported in Table 5.
The dierential average aect of democratization that emerges from Figure 1 is therefore
consistently conrmed by the regression analysis. The gure suggests that countries democra-
tizing violently suer from larger reduction in growth rates in the ve years after the transition.
Nonetheless the average dierence in growth is persistent and appears signicant even over a the
ten years horizon after democratization. The regression analysis conrms that the dierential
eect of democratization is persistent and robust to the explicit consideration of several controls.
To interpret these ndings, recall that the sample is restricted to permanent democratic transi-
tions. If violent transition are less likely to consolidate and stabilize into permanent democracies
then the episodes of violent movements towards democracy would be under-represented in the
sample. If this is the case then the estimated impact of violence during democratization is very
likely a conservative estimate of the dierential negative eect of violence.
Additional results show that the detrimental eect of violent transitions to democracy is
even larger when restricting attention to conicts with high intensity (more than 1,000 battle-
related casualties). In particular, for instance, Columns (1)-(4) of Table 6 show that when
restricting attention to armed conict with high intensity only, the any conict slows down
growth by 2-3 percentage points. Violent transitions involving a high intensity conict have an
even more negative growth eect than any conict. When distinguishing high and intermediate
intensity conicts (where intermediate intensity includes conicts with at least 25, but not more
than 1,000 battle-related casualties), a similar picture emerges. While democratic transitions
with intermediate conicts involve no growth eects compared to the control group (since the
coecient estimates of democratization and violent democratization are almost identical in size),
we nd that democratic transitions that involve a high intensity of conict have a signicant
negative eect on growth. Also the direct eect of conict on growth is more negative the higher
the intensity of conict.
The PRIO Data on civil conicts do not conne specic attention to violent struggles for
democratization. The results so far have been based on a classication of regime transition that
corresponds to an interaction eect between democratization and a violent conict in the year
15of democratization irrespective of whether the violent struggles is the result of a popular upraise
and attempts repressing it. Moreover, the conict measure is based on the number of battle-
related deaths exceeding a conventional threshold. An alternative classication of violent regime
transition is available from Freedom House (Karatnycky et al., 2005), which documents the
democratic transitions of the Third Wave according to the driving forces behind the transition
and the level of violence that was involved in the democratization event. The coding classies
democratic transitions according to an indicator of the level of violence that can take four values:
no violence, little violence, signicant violence and high violence. Using these alternative data
therefore allows to test the robustness of the previous results to a denition of conicts that
is specically related to democratization and uses dierent thresholds for violence. In order
to classify countries with a binary indicator to obtain comparable results, we code democratic
transitions to be violent if the level of violence during the transition was signicant or high
violence, or alternatively, only if the level of violence was high. As additional control, we add
the incidence of civil conict in some columns.
Table 7 presents the corresponding results. The results conrm the earlier ndings. In
particular, they document a signicant dierence in growth eects of peaceful and violent de-
mocratization events, with peaceful transitions to democracy exhibiting a signicant positive
growth eect, whereas violent transitions have no or even a negative eect on growth.22 The
results presented in Tables 4 and 7 conrm the previous nding on the important role of the
democratization scenario for the economic performance of the emerging democracy. Violence
during the transition is found to be crucial for the growth prospects of emerging democracies.
4 Conclusions
This paper has provided novel evidence on the interactions between violence, democratization
and economic performance based on data from the third wave of democratization. In particu-
lar, the results conrm the existence of a positive average treatment eect of democratization
on growth, but they also suggest that violent conicts, and in particular conicts for the con-
trol of the government, have a rst order negative eect on economic growth. The eect of
22Recall that, as before, the coecient on violent democratization reects an interaction eect that corresponds
to the additional growth eect of violent democratization compared to peaceful democratization. The fact that the
coecient is negative and of about the same magnitude as the democratization coecient signies that there is no
growth eect in violent transitions, since the positive eect of democratization is canceled out by the occurrence
of violence. In some cases, the negative eect of violent transitions is even larger in magnitude than the eect of
democratization, which indicates an overall negative eect on growth.
16democratization appears smaller in magnitude than reported in the literature once conicts
are controlled for in the empirical specication, potentially because democratization accelerates
growth partly through reducing the likelihood of violence. Finally, and in line with the view
that the moment of democratization represents a critical juncture of institutional development,
the empirical ndings show that the scenario under which the democratization takes place has
important implications for the growth eects of democratization. This implies that not only
the democratic transition may matter for growth, but that also the mode of this transition may
have important implications for the economic performance of the emerging democracies.
The results complement and qualify ndings in the recent empirical literature that point at
a positive average eect of democratization on growth. In particular, the results indicate that
the growth eect of democratization may actually be even larger that what previously thought,
but only if the transition to democracy is not accompanied by excessive violence. The evidence
presented in this paper, despite being based on data from the third wave of democratization,
might be insightful not only in an historical perspective, but might be also relevant in light
of the current democratization experiences in Northern African and Arabian countries, where
the scenarios of regime change and, in particular, the violence associated with the transition
to democracy, dier substantially across countries. Taking the evidence from the third wave
seriously, one may expect dierent future prospects for the emerging democracies in the region.
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25Table 6: Violent Democratization and Growth: Dierent Levels of Violence
Type of Armed Conict Any Incidence of Conict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democratization 1.236*** 1.195** 1.025** 1.042** 1.495*** 1.449*** 1.210*** 1.273**
[0.005] [0.014] [0.022] [0.032] [0.002] [0.00696] [0.009] [0.013]
Violent Democratization -2.535** -1.818 -2.613** -1.877 -2.896*** -2.241* -2.556*** -2.052*
(high intensity) [0.0208] [0.169] [0.019] [0.159] [0.004] [0.0562] [0.008] [0.068]
Armed Conict -3.191*** -2.084*** -3.943*** -2.671***
(high intensity) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Violent Democratization -1.491* -1.817* -1.938** -2.189*
(low intensity) [0.053] [0.0969] [0.046] [0.060]
Armed Conict -1.618*** -1.146**
(low intensity) [0.001] [0.013]
Lagged Growth and Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4772 4369 4772 4369 4772 4369 4772 4369
R-squared 0.251 0.215 0.259 0.219 0.251 0.216 0.264 0.223
Notes: p-values based on robust standard errors that allow for country-specic rst-order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in
brackets. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10-, 5-, 1-Percent level, respectively. Sample is all countries with at least 20 observations
for dependent variable; see Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) for details. All specications include country and year xed eects,
as well as lagged growth, two-year lagged income level and region-specic time trends. Specications with no \other controls" include
growth lagged by one and two periods and three-year lagged income levels. Other controls include current and lagged changes as well
as two-year lagged levels of investment, life expectancy, government spending and trade share.
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